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Negroponte
Muntader al-Zaidi’s words as he threw his shoes at the outgoing US President in the
Green Zone in Baghdad this week may well become the epitaph for George Bush’s
disastrous invasion of Iraq. It was a hugely symbolic act and was reminiscent of the
beating with shoes by angry Iraqis of Saddam’s statue – toppled by US troops as the Iraqi
capital fell to US forces - on the 9th of April 2003. Hurling his shoes at President Bush,
al-Zaidi declared his act a ‘gift’ from the Iraqis, ‘a farewell kiss you dog’. Al-Zaidi
concluded his rebuke of President Bush with the comment ‘This is from the widows, the
orphans and those who were killed in Iraq’.
Al-Zaidi’s comments reflect the anger of many Iraqis at the arguably unnecessary loss of
civilian lives during – and in the aftermath of – the US invasion of Iraq. It is estimated
that up to a quarter of a million Iraqi men, women and children have lost their lives since
the US invaded in March 2003. Many of the deaths have been attributed to a failure on
the part of the US as occupying forces to properly secure and administer the country.
Many reports, including one published by The Lancet cite the destruction of the country’s
security, energy, health and food infrastructure by US forces and resistance groups during
the invasion phase of the Iraq war and subsequent insurgency as central to the prolonged
– and perhaps avoidable – suffering of the Iraqi people.
Prior to the invasion itself, in February 2003, the US Army’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant
General Eric Shinseski – during testimony to the Armed Services Committee – warned
that the invasion force being assembled by President Bush was too small to secure and
administer Iraq properly. The full-blown insurgency that followed the ‘collapse’ of
Saddam’s regime in April 2003, along with the wanton destruction of much of Iraq’s key
infrastructure appeared to vindicate warnings given to the Bush administration by the US
military’s top generals. Few members of Bush’s inner circle have spoken frankly on the
record about the decision to invade Iraq with such a small invasion force.
However, speaking at Trinity College Dublin’s University Philosophical Society in late
November of this year, US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte made some
interesting and frank admissions about the foreign policy and security record of the
outgoing Bush administration – particularly as it applied to Iraq. Deputy Secretary of
State Negroponte was appointed by President Bush as US Ambassador to the United
Nations from 2001 until 2004 – during which period he played a pivotal role in attempts
to garner international support for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Subsequently, he
succeeded Paul Bremer as the US Ambassador to Iraq from 2004 to 2005. Thereafter, he
served as US Director of National Intelligence for two years from 2005 to 2007. As a
high profile Washington insider – throughout both terms of the Bush administration –
Deputy Secretary Negroponte played a key role in determining the shape and nature of
the Bush administration’s responses to 9/11 and its subsequent robust military and
foreign policy interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
During a lively question and answer session at the Philosophical Society on Monday,
Negroponte was asked many questions about the strategy behind the invasion of Iraq.
Responding to observations that the US invasion force was relatively small – at less than

250,000, barely one quarter of the total coalition force of over one million troops
assembled for Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield during the first Gulf War – he
admitted that the down-sized US occupation force was not strong enough to provide
security or the prospect of reconstruction for the Iraqi people. He observed that the Bush
administration, after the initial success in toppling Saddam’s regime, thought ‘the rest
would be easy’. He also observed that when he arrived as Ambassador to Iraq in 2004, he
expected to oversee the reconstruction of the country. However, he stated it was evident
that reconstruction was simply not possible and that the country was in the throes of a
‘widespread insurgency’ – an insurgency that the Bush administration ‘didn’t foresee’.
This admission, and assertion that the US did not anticipate a widespread insurgency
within Iraq, although such an insurgency had been predicted at the time by the US
general staff - along with most international intelligence and security analysts – leaves the
Bush administration open to the charge of having recklessly failed in its duty of care to
the newly ‘liberated’ citizens of Iraq. The fourth Geneva Convention explicitly sets out
the obligations and duties of an occupying force with regard to the physical security, food
security, health and welfare of its protected citizens. Deputy Secretary Negroponte’s
remarks in Dublin in November – coupled with the suffering endured by the Iraqi people
in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and the uncontrolled destruction of the
country’s key infrastructure – suggest strongly that the Bush administration were in clear
breach of their obligations towards ordinary Iraqi citizens under the Geneva Conventions.
Deputy Secretary Negroponte was equally candid about the fall off in support for the
invasion of Iraq within the US itself after the preliminary invasion phase. He stated that
‘initial support for the war’, was followed by a period during which the US experienced
‘substantial casualties’ and a decline in popular support for the war. He admitted that the
insurgency – primarily led by former regime elements and Al Qaeda cells operating
within Iraq – ‘affected the attitude at home’ towards the war.
This admission – that the Iraqi insurgency was directly responsible for the lowering of
domestic support for the Administration’s war aims there – sounded a warning note for
the future of America’s involvement in Afghanistan. With President-elect Obama
expected to increase the number of US troops deployed to an increasingly restive
Afghanistan, Negroponte made the insightful – and worrying - observation that the
Taliban’s ‘theory of victory’ was simply to ‘undermine the Afghan government’, ‘wear
out’ or severely ‘test’ the NATO partnership’s resolve to fight in Afghanistan and
ultimately, to simply ‘outlast the NATO alliance presence in Afghanistan’. Based on the
US experience in Iraq – as described by one of its chief proponents – and based on the
current strains and tensions within NATO, the short and long term prospects for a
continued US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan under President Obama look grim.
A decisive Victory in Afghanistan for NATO and its ISAF partners – including Ireland –
would appear to be as remote as it was for the Soviets during their occupation of the
country.
Deputy Secretary Negroponte did refer to some of ISAF’s successes in Afghanistan
including a reduction by 26% in the infant mortality rate there along with the

considerable achievement of providing education for over 6.5 million Afghan children –
including 1.5 million girls who were previously denied education under the Taliban
regime. He acknowledged the significant challenges that lie ahead for the new
administration in Afghanistan and in an interview with the Irish Times – given after his
public remarks – he identified the interlinked issues of the insurgency within Afghanistan
and an increasingly unstable and radicalised Pakistan as significant challenges for the
incoming Obama administration. Confronted with such seemingly intractable difficulties
- in a significant statement - Negroponte also indicated that in principle, he would not
rule out talks or negotiations with the Taliban and other resistance groups if certain
conditions were met and if there appeared to be some constructive political engagement
possible.
Responding to questions on the legacy of eight years of the foreign and domestic policies
of the Bush administration, Negroponte accepted that some commentators would charge
that the US had lost much of its international moral authority and had experienced a
diminution in its standing as a world power. He observed that these had been
‘controversial times’ but that one of the key characteristics of democratic states such as
the US and Ireland was that ‘honest people can openly disagree on what we believe to be
right and wrong’. He also stated that he felt ‘it is good to rationalise and discuss these
issues and to try and pass on the best possible understanding of our policies, aims and
objectives’. He stated that he and others in the Bush administration ‘accept the criticism’
that had come with the exercise of power in difficult circumstances and were ‘prepared to
line up to that’ and to openly discuss their motivations and rationale for foreign or
domestic policies in whatever forum - political or academic.

As the question and answer session drew to a close on Monday, a student of the
Philosophical Society asked Negroponte which one of the 43 Presidents of the United
States did he admire the most. Somewhat prophetically – and without hesitation – he
replied ‘President Roosevelt, for getting us through crisis’. As the Bush administration
prepares for transition to President-elect Obama, it is clear that however high the
expectations are for the new Democrat Presidency – the challenges are equally daunting.
Dr. Tom Clonan is the Irish Times Security Analyst. He lectures in the School of Media,
DIT.

